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Configuration Management (CM) plays a vital role in the development of trusted 
computing systems.  The Common Criteria (CC) provides a framework for performing 
Information Technology (IT) security evaluations of these systems and further 
emphasizes CM’s role in the development and evaluation process by specifying a 
minimum set of CM qualities for each Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL).  As an 
evaluation guide, the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation, Part 2:  Evaluation Methodology (CEM), recommends a set of minimum CM 
guidelines which can be used by evaluators in the performance of a CM evaluation at the 
lower Evaluated Assurance Levels.  Evaluators and developers will quickly note the 
CEM’s lack of recommended CM guidelines at the higher assurance levels. 
Thorough study of the listed references supports the hypothesis for this work:  
Configuration Management guidelines are useful in the evaluation of trusted computing 
systems.  As an assurance mechanism, complete CM guidance helps users of high 
assurance products obtain a degree of confidence the system security requirements 
operate as intended and do not contain clandestine code.  Complete CM guidance 
provides evaluators with a “completed assurance scale” and ensures only authorized 
changes were made to the TOE during development.   
Useful CM guidelines at the higher assurance levels (EAL5, 6, and 7) will help 
developers and evaluators ensure products meet the minimum requirements needed for 
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Configuration Management (CM) is an engineering discipline that is widely used 
in various development and manufacturing environments.  In the context of the Common 
Criteria, CM has dual roles.  When viewed from the developer’s standpoint, CM helps to 
prevent unauthorized modification to an information technology product during the 
development process.  Evaluators “see” or “perceive” an alternate view of CM’s role.  In 
this context, a CM evaluation assists the consumer in identifying the evaluated product, 
and ensures all configuration items are uniquely identified and required procedures were 
used to track and control changes made to the product. 
The Common Criteria provides an assurance scale based upon the premise that 
greater assurance results are achieved through more rigorous engineering paradigms 
accompanied by commensurately greater evaluation efforts.  Within this framework, CM 
is one of seven assurance classes and is further divided into three assurance families.  The 
assurance families provide the minimum requirements which must be met for a given 
evaluated assurance level (EAL). 
The Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) bridges the gap between abstract 
CC requirements and specific evaluator actions by providing minimum guidelines for 
evaluation at each Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL).  However, the CEM provides no 
guidelines beyond EAL4 and does not address the evaluation of CM in high assurance 
systems.  Thorough study of the listed references supports the hypothesis for this work:  
Configuration Management guidelines are useful in the evaluation of trusted computing 
systems.  As an assurance mechanism, complete CM guidance helps users of high 
assurance products obtain a degree of confidence the system security requirements 
operate as intended and do not contain clandestine code.  Complete CM guidance 
provides evaluators with a “completed assurance scale” and ensures only authorized 


























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Configuration Management is an engineering discipline that is widely used in 
various manufacturing environments for controlling changes made to products under 
development.  As an assurance mechanism in the development of Information 
Technology (IT) systems, Configuration Management helps to provide confidence that a 
product or system will operate as intended, and does not accidentally or intentionally 
deviate from its approved design specifications.  This work explores Configuration 
Management and its relationship to trusted computing systems. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation contains 
security specifications for IT products/systems [CCP199].  Through a mutual recognition 
arrangement among several countries, it was established that the Common Criteria (CC) 
would be utilized as the common basis for performing IT evaluations.  As a companion 
document to the CC, the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation [CEM99] provides guidelines for the application of CC requirements in the 
evaluation of products at lower Evaluated Assurance Levels (EALs):  EAL1-EAL4. 
This work develops guidelines for higher assurance levels, specifically:  EAL5, 
EAL6, and EAL7. 
C. GENERATING GUIDELINES 
This thesis focuses on a primary question, “Are Configuration Management 
evaluation methodology guidelines useful?”  While an obvious short answer is “yes”, a 
need for guidelines should be substantiated before generating guidelines.  If a need exists, 
then supporting documentation is required in order to generate useful guidelines.  
Requirements from the CC [CCP399] and previous CEM work [CEM99] provide the 
supporting documentation needed to generate CM evaluation methodology guidelines for 
higher assurance levels. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Configuration Management Evaluation Guidance for High Robustness Systems 
contains six chapters.  Chapter II gives the reader general background on Configuration 
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Management, setting the stage for understanding what type of guidelines are appropriate 
for the evaluation of high assurance CM requirements.  Chapter III relates configuration 
management and high assurance within the Common Criteria framework.  A need for 
evaluation guidelines and the associated requirements for meeting those guidelines are 
constructed in Chapter IV.  Recommended configuration management evaluation 
guidelines constructed utilizing academic research on the Common Criteria, prior 
evaluation guidelines, the developer’s CM system, and requirement dependencies are 
presented in Chapter V.  Chapter VI highlights the need for further work which will help 
maintain guideline validity.   
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II. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
Configuration management is widely used in several disciplines and job 
descriptions.  By understanding configuration management’s origin, definition, purpose, 
and value the reader should be able to understand its use and relation to the Common 
Criteria. 
A. ORIGIN OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM) 
Configuration Management (CM) describes an engineering discipline developed 
in the late 1950s and 1960s as a means to control the skyrocketing costs of complicated 
hardware and mechanical systems [ICM96].  As a discipline, CM continues to evolve and 
currently encompasses many different industries and is implemented through automated 
and non-automated tools and processes.  Due to widespread use, CM can mean different 
things to different people based on an organization’s culture and processes.  From a 
personnel perspective the term might address the roles mangers play when performing 
CM duties or functions.  A product view might relate CM as a description of the 
product’s components and sub-assemblies that make up the components.  Another 
example includes the use of CM as a means for process improvement.  This view, 
espoused by the Capability Maturity Model (CMM), an organizational scheme with five 
hierarchical “levels”, requires CM processes to be implemented and in use before an 
organization can reach CMM level 2.  (People, Product, and Process perspectives were 
mentioned in the introduction section, page xli-xliii, [CMP03]).  While there might be 
many other interpretations, for the purpose of this work, CM describes the control 
process related to software or computer system product development. 
B. DEFINITION OF CM 
While CM can have numerous associations, a definition of CM as it relates to the 
Common Criteria (CC) and Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) has not been 
formalized by inclusion within the CC.  Numerous references outside of the CC provide 
useful definitions of CM.  Certainly, a good definition would include a derivation from 
standards documents used prior to acceptance of the CC.  An obvious choice for a 
definition source would have to include a definition from previous evaluation literature 
[AGT88]: 
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Configuration Management maintains control of a system throughout its 
life-cycle, ensuring that the system in operation is the correct system, 
implementing the correct security policy. 
While this may be helpful it is important to realize the guideline from which this 
definition is taken has been superceded by the CC.  Another definition from current work 
in software configuration management is provided by Ann Mette Jonassen Hass 
[CMP03]: 
Configuration management is the unique identification, controlled storage, 
change control and status reporting of selected intermediate work 
products, product components, and products during the life of a system. 
Key elements for any CM definition used by evaluators should recognize 
identification and control as concepts used in the majority of CM definitions in references 
today. 
C. PURPOSE OF CM 
CM has two roles within the CC and CEM.  From a developer standpoint the CC 
[CCP399] describes CM’s purpose as: 
Configuration management (CM) helps to ensure that the integrity of the 
TOE (Target of Evaluation) is preserved, by requiring discipline and 
control in the processes of refinement and modification of the TOE and 
other related information.  CM prevents unathorised modifications, 
additions, or deletions to the TOE, thus providing assurance that the TOE 
and documentation used for evaluation are the ones prepared for 
distribution. 
From an evaluator standpoint the CEM [CEM99] describes CM’s role as: 
The purpose of the configuration management activity is to assist the 
consumer in identifying the evaluated TOE, to ensure that configuration 
items are uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are 
used by the developer to control and track changes that are made to the 
TOE.  This includes details on what changes are tracked, how potential 
changes are incorporated, and the degree to which automation is used to 





D. VALUE OF CM 
The value of CM lies in its inherent abilities in providing a control mechanism 
able, 
…to maintain the integrity of products as they evolve from specifications 
through design, development, and production [ICM96]. 
In terms of the Common Criteria (CC), maintaining this integrity helps to provide 
an assurance (grounds for confidence) that the products meets their security objectives 
[CCP399].  By ensuring the developer has met the required CM security assurance 
requirements, the evaluator is providing an independent review on behalf of consumers 
who might not have the expertise to perform an objective evaluation. 
Understanding CM’s origin helps to show how the discipline has been 
incorporated into various engineering activities and industries.  Despite wide use, most 
definitions from past references and current software engineering material provide 
identification and control of configuration items as key elements for any relevant CM 
definition.  In addition these concepts are echoed in CM’s purpose as described in the CC 
and CEM.  The value of CM lies in its ability to maintain the integrity of products 
throughout the development process.  By understanding CM’s origin, definition, purpose, 
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III. CM’S ROLE IN HIGH ASSURANCE SYSTEMS 
Prior to understanding CM’s role in high assurance systems, a short definition and 
explanation of assurance and its necessity are required.  Additionally, background 
information on the CC assurance approach will also guide efforts in determining CM’s 
role in the CC and the CEM.  Finally, how CM requirements change as the assurance 
level changes will highlight the need for guidelines as a way to help developers and 
evaluators understand changing CM requirements as the evaluated assurance level 
changes.  The need for this understanding provides support for this work’s hypothesis:  
guidance extension of the CEM for high assurance CM is useful. 
A. DEFINITION OF ASSURANCE 
Before CM’s role within high assurance systems is explored, it is necessary to 
understand what is meant by assurance and “high assurance” within the CC.  The CC 
defines assurance as [CCP199]: 
…grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives. 
Further definition clarification comes from Part 3 of the CC [CCP399] and states: 
Assurance is grounds for confidence that an IT product or system meets its 
security objectives. 
If assurance provides grounds for confidence, it would follow that high assurance 
provides grounds for high confidence that an IT product or system meets its security 
requirements.  In broader context, the assurance provided during an evaluation helps to 
demonstrate specific security requirements in a Security Target (ST) or general 
requirements in a Protection Profile (PP) are met [CCP199].  
B. NEED FOR HIGH ASSURANCE 
The ultimate requirement for high assurance can be determined by an asset’s 
value by its owner.  Frequently high value assets are also of value to attackers who wish 
to compromise or damage the asset.  Most security courses determine damage through 
loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, or loss of availability [SMS03].  Any IT product 
or system that places high value on these areas has a need for high security requirements 
in order to minimize the damage (loss of value) to the asset.  Users of high security 
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products need a high degree of confidence the system security requirements operate as 
intended and do not contain clandestine code [SCS80].  This confidence can be achieved 
by way of a high assurance evaluation of the system.  With respect to evaluation 
assurance levels articulated in the CC, “high” assurance is often related to Evaluated 
Assurance Level (EAL) 5 and above.  Alternatively, the term “high robustness” is used in 
various CC related documents currently in production.  High robustness refers to EAL 
levels “greater than 4”. 
C. CC ASSURANCE APPROACH 
The CC acknowledges many approaches can be used to provide assurance, 
however the CC focuses on “traditional” evaluation approaches as a means of gaining 
assurance.  Some of the evaluation assurance techniques listed in the CC are [CCP399]: 
a) analysis and checking of process(es) and procedure(s); 
b) checking that process(es) and procedure(s) are being applied; 
c) analysis of the correspondence between TOE design representations; 
d) analysis of the TOE design representation against the requirements; 
e) verification of proofs; 
f) analysis of guidance documents; 
g) analysis of functional tests developed and the results provided; 
h) independent functional testing; 
i) analysis for vulnerabilities (including flaw hypothesis); 
j) penetration testing. 
D. SECURITY ASSURANCE SCALE 
The CC provides an assurance scale based on the premise that greater assurance 
results will be achieved through more rigorous engineering paradigms accompanied by 
commensurately greater evaluation efforts.  This graded assurance scale specifies the 
minimum effort required to achieve the desired assurance level.  Advancing to the next 
higher assurance level is based on three elements [CCP399]: 
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a) scope — that is, the effort is greater because a larger portion of the IT 
product or system is included; 
b) depth — that is, the effort is greater because it is deployed to a finer 
level of design and implementation detail; 
c) rigour — that is, the effort is greater because it is applied in a more 
structured, formal manner. 
While developers can state their product meets a certain level, the individual 
product can only be at a rated Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) after a certifying 
authority has verified an independent evaluation of the product.  Only after an evaluation 
is certified, can a product state it has an EAL value.  The CC’s assurance scale ranges 
from EAL1 to EAL7, with EAL7 being the highest possible assurance level. 
E. CM’S DEVELOPMENT ROLE IN THE CC 
CM is one of seven classes of security assurance requirements designated within 
the CC framework.  As indicated by its name, the CM class contains requirements for 
CM assurance in the development context.  These requirements enable the developer to 
provide evidence of Target of Evaluation (TOE) integrity and how it was maintained 
during the development process.  The CM class is composed of three assurance families: 
CM automation, CM capabilities, and CM scope.  Each assurance family can be further 
broken down into at least one assurance component.  Every assurance component 
contains a set of assurance elements.  The CC defines an assurance element [CCP399] as 
the: 
…smallest security requirement recognized in the CC. 
As the smallest recognized security requirement, assurance elements belong to 
one of three groupings:  developer, content and evaluator.  CM’s development role in 
high assurance systems comes from required developer assurance elements as required by 
Part 3 of the CC.  Additionally, developers are also given content requirements which are 
required to provide TOE integrity evidence. 
F. CM’S EVALUATION ROLE IN THE CC 
Just as CM maintains a development role in the CC framework, it also provides 
an evaluation role.  As mentioned above, Part 3 of the CC provides security assurance 
requirements.  The smallest recognized evaluator assurance element describes [CCP399]: 
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…the activities that shall be performed by the evaluator.  This set of 
actions explicitly includes confirmation that the requirements prescribed in 
the content and presentation of evidence elements have been met. 
The CC also provides explicit actions and analysis that shall be performed in 
addition to those already performed by the developer.  When accomplished by an 
evaluator, the required evaluator element is used to make a determination that the 
provided content and developer elements satisfy the minimum assurance requirements for 
a stated EAL. 
G. CM REQUIREMENTS CHANGE AS THE EVALUATED ASSURANCE 
LEVEL (EAL) INCREASES 
By now, it should be easily recognized that requirements will change as the EAL 
level changes.  Figure 1 provides a portion of Table B.1 [CCP399] from Part 3 of the CC 
and provides a quick reference which can be used by developers and evaluators to 
determine what component version numbers by assurance family are needed at a given 
EAL.  Since our focus is only on CM, only that part of the table has been provided. 
 
Figure 1.   Portion of Table B.1 [CCP399] 
 
While Figure 1 provides a ready reference for version numbers, it is not a 
substitute for an exact understanding of “what changes” as the EAL increases.  Thorough 
study of Part 3 of the CC [CCP399] is needed to ensure developers and evaluators 
understand exact changes when moving from one EAL to another.  It is important to 
remember the EAL assurance scale is graded and represents the minimum requirements 
to be met in order to provide the stated assurance level.  For each EAL the requirements 
either inherit previous assurance family components or build on previous components by 
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including additions and/or changes to meet the minimum requirements for the next higher 
level.  Visually, these concepts are presented in Figure 2, and exact CM requirement 





























Figure 2.   CM Component Change and Inheritance as the EAL Increases 
 
H. CM CHANGES AS THE EAL INCREASES 
For the un-initiated developer or evaluator, Figure 2 provides a visual 
representation for change and inheritance regarding CM assurance requirements as the 
EAL increases.  As mentioned in the previous section, an increase in EAL could require 
changes or additions to previous requirements within an assurance family.  These 
changes or additions are represented with a solid slanted arrow (e.g. changes to the scope 
family (ACM_SCP) are needed when increasing from EAL4 to EAL5).  Figure 2 
represents inheritance from one EAL to another by using double arrows (e.g. EAL5 
automation requirements are inherited without change or additions from EAL4).  Only 
the exact requirements changes or additions are presented in the subsections below. 
1. CM Changes from EAL4 to EAL5 
Scope assurance family (ACM_SCP) objectives change to include development 
tools CM coverage [CCP399]: 
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Development tools play an important role in ensuring the production of a 
quality version of the TOE.  Therefore, it is important to control 
modifications to these tools. 
The following change to content and presentation of evidence elements is noted: 
ACM_SCP.2.1C maps to ACM_SCP.3.1C and adds development tools and 
related information to the minimum list of items that must be tracked by the CM system 
[CCP399]: 
ACM_SCP.3.1C  The CM documentation shall show that the CM system, 
as a minimum, tracks the following:  the TOE implementation 
representation, design documentation, test documentation, user 
documentation, administrator documentation, CM documentation, security 
flaws, and development tools and related information. 
2. CM Changes from EAL5 to EAL6 
Automation (ACM_AUT) family requirements change in order to meet the 
minimum assurance for EAL6.  Automation objectives change to include the following 
objective [CCP399]: 
Providing an automated means of ascertaining changes between versions 
of the TOE and identifying which configuration items are affected by 
modifications to other configuration items assists in determining the 
impact of the changes between successive versions of the TOE.  This in 
turn can provide valuable information in determining whether changes to 
the TOE result in all configuration items being consistent with one 
another. 
Content and presentation of evidence elements requirements change to include a 
change and two additional requirements.  ACM_AUT.1.1.C maps to ACM_AUT.2.1.C 
and includes a change that adds all other configuration items [CCP399]: 
ACM_AUT.2.1C  The CM system shall provide an automated means by 
which only authorized changes are made to the TOE implementation 
representation, and to all other configuration items. 
ACM_AUT.2.5C  The CM system shall provide an automated means to 
ascertain the changes between the TOE and its previous version. 
ACM_AUT.2.6C  The CM system shall provide an automated means to 
identify all other configuration items that are affected by the modification 
of a given configuration item.   
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In addition to automation changes, Capability (ACM_CAP) assurance family 
changes are also needed to meet EAL6 requirements.  The capabilities objectives change 
to include advanced support [CCP399]: 
Integration procedures help to ensure that generation of the TOE from a 
managed set of configuration items is correctly performed in an authorized 
manner. 
Requiring that the CM system be able to identify the master copy of the 
material used to generate the TOE helps to ensure that the integrity of this 
material is preserved by the appropriate technical, physical and procedural 
safeguards. 
Content and presentation of evidence elements requirements change to include a 
change and nine additional requirements.  ACM_CAP.5.3C inherits all of the 
requirements from ACM_CAP.4.3C and adds integration procedures as required CM 
documentation for EAL 5 [CCP399]: 
ACM_CAP.5.3C  The CM documentation shall include a configuration 
list, a CM plan, an acceptance plan, and integration procedures. 
ACM_CAP.5.13C  The integration procedures shall describe how the CM 
system is applied in the TOE manufacturing process. 
ACM_CAP.5.14C  The CM system shall require that the person 
responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person 
who developed it. 
ACM_CAP.5.15C  The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration 
items that comprise the TSF. 
ACM_CAP.5.16C  The CM system shall support the audit of all 
modifications to the TOE, including as a minimum the originator, date, 
and time in the audit trail. 
ACM_CAP.5.17C  The CM system shall be able to identify the master 
copy of all material used to generate the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.18C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the use 
of the CM system, together with the development security measures, allow 
only authorized changes to be made to the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.19C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the use 
of the integration procedures ensures that the generation of the TOE is 
correctly performed in an authorized manner. 
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ACM_CAP.5.20C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the CM 
system is sufficient to ensure that the person responsible for accepting a 
configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it. 
ACM_CAP.5.21C  The CM documentation shall justify that the 
acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of 
changes to all configuration items. 
3. CM Changes from EAL6 to EAL7 
As noted in Part 3 of the CC, there are no changes or additions to CM in order to 
meet EAL7 requirements for CM. 
An understanding of assurance and why it is important are key concepts when 
considering CM’s role in high assurance systems.  The assurance approach utilized 
within the CC focuses on a graded scale in which the minimum items needed for an 
associated assurance level are expressed as the minimum requirements for an EAL.  As 
an assurance class, CM and its families play an important role as an assurance 
mechanism.  By presenting the CM changes needed to meet the next higher level, the CC 
provides developers and evaluators a roadmap that can be used when developing or 
evaluating an IT product or system. 
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IV. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT EVALUATION 
METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES 
Guidelines can be defined as statements or other indications of policy or 
procedure by which to determine a course of action.  While the previous sections give 
background and CM requirements, they do not to provide useful guidelines that would 
enable developers and evaluators to incorporate needed requirements in order to meet a 
stated EAL.  As a complementary document to the CC, the Common Methodology for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:  Evaluation Methodology (CEM) 
bridges the gap between requirements and performing an evaluation of a system intended 
to meet those requirements. 
A. ARE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM) GUIDELINES USEFUL 
IN THE EVALUATION OF TRUSTED SYSTEMS? 
As a course of action, the CEM provides a set of guidelines for use by the 
international IT security evaluation community.  As a companion document to the CC, 
the CEM guidelines help evaluators determine what actions are needed to determine that 
a TOE has met the requirements for an EAL.  It is important to note, however, that the 
CEM only offers guidelines through EAL4 and leaves higher assurance guidelines to be 
developed by individual countries.  CM Guidelines for EAL5 – EAL7 are beneficial for 
several reasons: 
• EAL 5 – 7 CM guidelines would provide a “ready reference” training 
guide for evaluators; 
• CM guidelines emphasize what minimum actions need to be performed in 
the context of a particular EAL; 
• CM guidelines provide a plain language CC companion document; 
• CM guidelines will help prepare U.S. organizations perform an EAL7 
evaluation. 
B. NEED FOR GUIDELINES 
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A need for a complete set of EAL guidelines is highlighted by recent 
congressional testimony.  In his September 17, 2003, testimony before the Committee on 
Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Edward Roback, Chief, Computer Security 
Division National Institute of Standards and Technology mentions the application of the 
CC provides needed assurance for the government’s IT products [ECC03].  His testimony 
also states that ways are needed to reduce the costs of evaluations and provides examples 
of “what could be done”.  Specific examples from his testimony follow: 
Develop CC interpretations that clarify and simplify how parts of the CC 
are to be evaluated.  
Provide better training to lab evaluators and NIAP (National Information 
Assurance Partnership) validators, with emphasis on which actions need to 
be performed and which do not.  
Provide an extensive/complete set of guidance documents for all 
stakeholders in the evaluation process (e.g., developers, evaluators, 
validators, commercial and government users).  
Provide clear guidance to stakeholders to choose only those assurance 
requirements that are meaningful for their intended use/environments.  
Perform a critical assessment of the current evaluation process to ensure 
that: 
• NIAP activities and levels of effort are consistent with those of 
other CC Recognition Arrangement partners  
• Evaluation activities are being performed efficiently 
• There are no unnecessary activities being performed  
• All activities that can be performed in parallel are in fact done that 
way. 
While Mr. Roback’s testimony represents a broad based “call to arms”, a 
complete set of evaluation guidelines answers his call for more research and provides: 
better training to evaluators, plain language interpretations of the CC, and a more 
complete set of guidance to the CC documents.  Clearly a complete set of CEM 
guidelines which include EAL5 through 7 are appropriate in answering his call. 
Currently, the CEM’s usefulness is limited only to the lower EAL levels.  CEM 
guidelines which include higher assurance levels could help to standardize evaluations 
performed at higher levels within the United States.  As the need for higher level 
evaluations increases, it is appropriate for the U.S. CM community to develop, promote, 
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and recommend minimum guidelines for IT products which need evaluation at higher 
assurance levels which are not currently included in the CEM. 
C. GUIDELINE FORMAT 
EAL5 through 7 guidelines developed here pick up where the CEM stops.  Due to 
inheritance and change properties of CM requirements as the EAL increases, prior 
guideline work from EAL4 [CEM99] will be used as a starting point for generating new 
guidelines.  As a follow on to the CEM, the proposed guidelines are intended to help 
define the minimum effort for achieving an evaluation at a given EAL and: 
…to provide guidance on ways and means to accomplish the evaluation 
[CEM99]. 
Although guidelines can take many forms, the proposed guidelines are meant to 
present a recommended action item/CM check list which evaluators can incorporate into 
any test plan.  Similar to the CEM, the guidelines will provide the content and 
presentation of evidence elements individually, followed by recommended evaluator 
action items for the required element.  Where practical, the content and presentation 
elements will be numbered and language similar to the CEM will be used.   
D. EAL5 GUIDELINES 
EAL5 guidelines are only useful when the context of the assurance level is 
understood [CCP399]: 
This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by 
requiring semiformal design descriptions, the entire implementation, a 
more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, covert channel 
analysis, and improved mechanisms and/or procedures that provide 
confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development. 
In support of the increased assurance, the CM assurance class scope family 
components change to include the maximum scope attainable.  These requirements 
directly support confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development.  
New developmental tamper proofing efforts include a change to the list of items tracked 
by the CM system.  ACM_SCP.3.1C covers this change [CCP399]: 
The CM documentation shall show that the CM system, as a minimum, 
tracks the following:  the TOE,…,security flaws, and development tools 
and related information. 
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1. EAL5 Action Item Generation 
Careful reading of the new requirement points to three exploration areas when 
determining the need for recommending minimum action items for an evaluator 
performing an evaluation of ACM_SCP.3.1.C:  the CM documentation at EAL5, the CM 
system, and the application notes.   
a. Reviewing the CM Documentation 
CM documentation at EAL5 is comprised of items noted in 
ACM_CAP.4.3C [CCP399]: 
ACM_CAP.4.3C  The CM documentation shall include a configuration 
list, a CM plan and an acceptance plan. 
What these items are and do follow: 
ACM_CAP.4.4C  The configuration list shall describe the configuration 
items that comprise the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.4.7.C  The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is 
used. 
ACM_CAP.4.12.C  The acceptance plan shall describe the procedures 
used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the 
TOE. 
Previous changes in scope (EAL3 to 4) have set the precedent that the 
evaluator “shall check” the configuration list to ensure it includes the minimum set of 
items tracked by the CM system.  However, due to the importance of development tools 
and the need for prevention of subversion during the development process, it would be 
appropriate for evaluators to confirm if the provided development tools and related 
documentation on the configuration list are sufficient for the required evaluated assurance 
level.  Clearly, development tools may be listed in other areas of CM documentation.  As 
a point of clarity, to “confirm” [CCP399] means to: 
…indicate that something needs to be reviewed in detail, and that an 




Reviewing CM documentation would lead to two recommendations for 
evaluator action items in support of ACM_SCP.3.1.C:  build on the inherited 
ACM_SCP.2.1C and also require the evaluator to “confirm” necessary visibility within 
all of the CM documentation. 
b. CM System Operation 
“Vaporware” is a term often used to describe non-existent software.  
While we would like to trust every developer, it is important to verify the configuration 
list items presented in the CM documentation directly correspond to the configuration 
items within the CM system.  Verification between documentation and software will 
ensure the developer is not providing a “vapor list”.  As noted previously, “confirm” 
means to make an independent determination of sufficiency.  This would not require the 
evaluator to have independent access to the CM system.  As such this action item could 
be easily verified by observation of the appropriate portion of the CM system. 
c. Application Notes 
The application notes for ACM_SCP.3.1C help to provide the evaluator 
examples of development tools and related documentation [CCP399]: 
ACM_SCP.3.1C introduces the requirement that development tools and 
other related information be tracked by the CM system.  Examples of 
development tools are programming languages and compilers.  
Information pertaining to TOE generation items (such as compiler options, 
installation/generation options, and build options) is an example of 
information relating to development tools. 
2. Recommended Evaluator Actions 
By examining the application notes, the CM documentation and the CM system, 
the following three action items are recommended.  Together, the inherited items from 
EAL4 and the recommended additions constitute the proposed evaluator CM guidelines 
for EAL5 (bold type shows the difference between EAL4 and EAL5 guidelines): 
ACM_SCP.3.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list includes the minimum 
set of items required by the CC to be tracked by the CM system.  The list 
should include at a minimum: 
• all documentation required to meet the target level of assurance; 
• test software (if applicable); 
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• the TOE implementation representation (i.e. the components or 
subsystems that compose the TOE).  For a software-only TOE, the 
implementation representation may consist solely of source code; 
for a TOE that includes a hardware platform, the implementation 
representation may refer to a combination of software, firmware 
and a description of the hardware (or a reference platform). 
• the documentation used to record details of reported security flaws 
associated with the implementation (e.g. problem status reports 
derived from a developer’s problem reporting database). 
• development tools (e.g. programming languages and compilers) 
and related documentation (e.g. information pertaining to 
TOE generation items (such as compiler options, 
installation/generation options, and build options).   
• The evaluator shall confirm the level of documentation necessary for 
ensuring proper visibility of the development tools and related 
documentation throughout the entire CM documentation. 
• The evaluator shall confirm the development tools and related 
documentation listed in the CM documentation are resident in the 
CM system.  In performance of this action item, the evaluator does 
not need independent access to determine the sufficiency of 
correspondence between the system configuration list and 
documentation. 
3. EAL5 Summary 
Reasonable CM guideline recommendations have been derived from the 
application notes, CC requirements, and the vendor’s CM system.  These recommended 
evaluator actions help to ensure the TOE will not be tampered with during the 
development process. 
E. EAL6 GUIDELINES 
Similar to EAL5, the context for EAL6 must be understood before guidelines can 
be recommended [CCP399]: 
This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL5 by 
requiring more comprehensive analysis, a structured representation of the 
implementation, more architectural structure (e.g. layering), more 
comprehensive independent vulnerability analysis, systematic covert 
channel identification, and improved configuration management and 




CM system “automation” and “capabilities” changes are key in providing the 
minimum assurance requirements for an evaluation at EAL6.  Although the ideas of 
inheritance and change have been mentioned in other thesis sections, EAL 6 
recommended guidelines for automation and capabilities are evolved from the CEM 
[CEM99].  EAL6 requires no further changes to CM “scope” family and those items are 
inherited from EAL5. 
1. EAL6 Action Item Generation in Support of Complete CM 
Automation 
EAL6 action item generation for complete CM automation (ACM_AUT) follows 
a similar investigative path used to generate evaluator action items for EAL5.  As 
presented in Section III, the CM automation changes at EAL6 include [CCP399]: 
ACM_AUT.2.1C  The CM system shall provide an automated means by 
which only authorized changes are made to the TOE implementation 
representation, and to all other configuration items. 
ACM_AUT.2.5C  The CM system shall provide an automated means to 
ascertain the changes between the TOE and its preceding version. 
ACM_AUT.2.6C  The CM system shall provide an automated means to 
identify all other configuration items that are affected by the modification 
of a given configuration item. 
By exploring the CM documentation, CM system, application notes and 
dependencies on other assurance families, evaluator action items for the automation 
requirements can be determined.   
a. Reviewing the CM Documentation 
At first glance, it might appear there is no need for reviewing CM 
documentation in support of recommending automation evaluator guidelines at EAL6.  
However complete automation is dependent on the authorization controls required by the 
CM capabilities family (ACM_CAP.3 version numbers), and should have been 
established at EAL3.  Authorization controls requires a configuration list and a CM plan 
[CCP399].  The case for reviewing the CM plan for documenting complete automation 




ACM_CAP.3.7C  The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used. 
ACM_CAP.3.8C  The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is 
operating in accordance with the CM Plan. 
The CM plan provides the written description of how authorized changes 
will be made to the TOE and configuration items.  The requirement for automation is 
intended to reduce the potential for error in complex development environments.  Any 
“automated means” regarding system operation will be described by the CM plan in order 
to support the dependent items above.   
b. CM System Operation 
Complete CM system automation will be described by the CM plan.  
Operation of the CM system will help the evaluator determine if the “automated means” 
mentioned in the CM plan is adequate and accurately represents the requirements or 
procedures in the CM plan.  Various CM systems may implement the “automated means” 
differently.  An example of determining changes between the TOE and a preceding 
version may include some sort of report (paper or screen shot).  The evaluator should 
“confirm” the CM system provides the “automated means” to ascertain the TOE changes 
or configuration item changes by observing the appropriate operational functions of the 
CM system. 
c. Application Notes 
A single application note for complete CM automation would help to 
provide an example which can be mentioned when recommending an evaluator action 
item to support ACM_AUT.2.5C [CCP399]: 
ACM_AUT.2.5C introduces a requirement that the CM system provide an 
automated means to ascertain the changes between the TOE and its 
preceding version.  If no previous version of the TOE exists, the developer 
still needs to provide an automated means to ascertain the changes 
between the TOE and a future version of the TOE. 
d. Exploring Family Dependencies 
Family dependencies are an important part for understanding automation 
requirements at EAL6.  Evaluation of complete automation depends on the authorization 
controls put in place when meeting ACM_CAP.3 version numbers.  As mentioned in the 
documentation section above, the CM plan will describe the authorization procedures that 
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will be implemented by automated means at EAL6.  An evaluator should have a complete 
understanding of ACM_CAP.3 prior to commencing an evaluation at EAL6. 
2. EAL6 Action Item Generation for Advanced Support 
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP) changes which require evaluation action items are 
[CCP399]: 
ACM_CAP.5.3C  The CM documentation shall include a configuration 
list, a CM plan, an acceptance plan, and Integration procedures. 
ACM_CAP.5.13C  The integration procedures shall describe how the CM 
system is applied in the TOE manufacturing process. 
ACM_CAP.5.14C The CM system shall require that the person 
responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person 
who developed it. 
ACM_CAP.5.15C  The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration 
items that comprise the TSF. 
ACM_CAP.5.16C The CM system shall support the audit of all 
modifications to the TOE, including as a minimum the originator, date, 
and time in the audit trail. 
ACM_CAP.5.17C  The CM system shall be able to identify the master 
copy of all material used to generate the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.18C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the use 
of the CM system, together with the development security measures, allow 
only authorized changes to be made to the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.19C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the use 
of the integration procedures ensures that the generation of the TOE is 
correctly performed in an authorized manner. 
ACM_CAP.5.20C  The CM documentation shall demonstrate that the CM 
system is sufficient to ensure that the person responsible for accepting a 
configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it. 
ACM_CAP.5.21C  The CM documentation shall justify that the 
acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of 
changes to all configuration items. 
a. Reviewing the CM Documentation 
Integration procedures round out the fully developed CM documentation 
area which can be explored when recommending minimum evaluator guidelines at EAL6.  
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ACM_CAP.5.13C provides the following description of integration procedures 
[CCP399]: 
The integration procedures shall describe how the CM system is applied in 
the TOE manufacturing process. 
Fully developed CM documentation is needed to support the requirements 
at EAL6.  At this level any “system shall” verbiage in a requirement ultimately requires 
the system to perform an operation that meets a required operation or performs a function 
using information from the CM documentation.  At this level a “one-for-one” 
documentation check is appropriate for recommending minimum evaluator action items 
to meet the capability requirements at EAL6. 
b. CM System Operation 
CM system capabilities provide advanced support at EAL6.  As noted 
from the new capability requirements mentioned in Section 2 above 
(ACM_CAP.5.14C/5.15C/5.16C/5.17C), a minimum of four action items are 
recommended in order for evaluators to “confirm” the vendor’s CM system performs the 
capabilities as intended. 
c. Application Notes 
There are no application notes to explore for CM capabilities.   
d. Exploring Assurance Class Dependencies 
Dependencies between the CM assurance (ACM) and Life cycle support 
assurance (ALC) classes occur at EAL6.  While some CM specialists may feel the ALC 
requirements are different and beyond the scope of CM evaluation, it is appropriate to 
derive evaluator action items implied from the dependency between the two classes. 
Content and presentation of evidence elements for life cycle support 
follow [CCP399]: 
ALC_DVS.2.1C  The development security documentation shall describe 
all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that 
are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design 
and implementation in its development environment. 
ALC_DVS.2.2C  The development security documentation shall provide 
evidence that these security measures are followed during the 
development and maintenance of the TOE. 
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ALC_DVS.2.3C  The evidence shall justify that the security measures 
provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality 
and integrity of the TOE. 
In addition to content and presentation of evidence, an additional evaluator 
action item from ALC_DVS should be considered [CCP399]: 
The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied. 
3. Summary for Generating EAL6 Guidelines 
Successful evaluations at EAL 6 will require much greater effort (than EAL5) due 
to the need for fully developed automation and capabilities requirements imposed on the 
vendor’s CM system.  Family dependencies at EAL6 further aggravate difficult 
evaluation tasks faced by CM evaluators.  By exploring the CM documentation, CM 
system, application notes, and family dependencies, the proposed evaluator guidelines 
supporting changes or additions at EAL6 also incorporate the ideas of change and 
inheritance from previous CEM and EAL5 work.  EAL6 guidelines supporting new 
requirements follow (bold type shows the difference between EAL5 and EAL6): 
ACM_AUT.2.1C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the automated 
measures to control access to the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall check the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unauthorized modification 
of the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the automated 
measures to control access to the configuration items. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unathorised 
modification of configuration items. 
• The evaluator reviews the configuration management 
documentation to identify those individuals or roles authorized to 
make changes to the TOE implementation representation.  For 
example, once it is under configuration management, access to an 
element of the implementation representation may only be allowed 
for the individual who performs the software integration role.  
Similarly, the evaluator reviews the CM documentation to identify 
those individuals or roles authorized to access a configuration item. 
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• The evaluator should exercise the automated access control 
measures to determine whether they can be bypassed by an 
unauthorized role or user.  This determination need only be 
comprised of a few basic tests.  Tests should cover the TOE 
implementation representation and configuration items. 
ACM_AUT.2.5C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for a description of 
the automated means by which changes can be ascertained between 
the TOE and its preceding version. 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM system to ensure it has the 
capability to provide automated tracking for changes between the 
TOE and its preceding version. 
• Previous TOE versions may or may not exist.  Regardless, 
evaluators should exercise the automated change tracking 
within the CM system or verify the capability exists. 
ACM_AUT.2.6C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation includes 
information on the automated means to identify all other 
configuration items that are affected by the modification of a given 
configuration item. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated means used by the CM 
system to identify all other configuration items that are affected by 
the modification of a given configuration item. 
• The CM documentation should state how the automated means 
will identify the changes to configuration items that are 
affected by the modification of a given configuration item.  CM 
systems may differ in the way how this information is 
presented. 
ACM_CAP.5.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
configuration list. 
• A configuration list identifies the items being maintained under 
configuration control. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
CM plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes 
an acceptance plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided 
includes integration procedures. 
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ACM_CAP.5.13C 
• The evaluator shall check that the integration procedures describe 
how the CM system is applied in the TOE manufacturing process. 
ACM_CAP.5.14C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation describes 
configuration item acceptance procedures. 
• The evaluator shall verify configuration item acceptance procedures 
in the CM system perform as described by the CM documentation. 
• The CM system should prevent the person who developed the 
configuration item from being able to accept it.  
ACM_CAP.5.15C 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation clearly identifies all 
configuration items that comprise the TSF. 
• The evaluator shall verify that the configuration items that comprise 
the TSF are clearly identified in the CM system.  
ACM_CAP.5.16C 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation describes the audit 
capabilities of the CM system.   
• The CM system, at a minimum, will track all TOE 
modifications to include:  the originator, date, and time in the 
audit trail. 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM system’s TOE audit capabilities. 
• The audit portion of the CM system shall provide, at a 
minimum, the originator, date and time in the audit trail. 
ACM_CAP.5.17C 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation describes how the 
CM system will identify the master copy of all material used to 
generate the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM system identifies the master copy of 
all material used to generate the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.18C 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation describes how the 
use of the CM system and developmental security measures will only 





• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation describes how 
the use of the integration procedures will ensure that the generation of 
the TOE is performed correctly in the authorized manner.  
ACM_CAP.5.20C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation sufficiently 
describes how the CM system will ensure that the person responsible 
for accepting a configuration item into the CM system is not the 
person who developed it. 
ACM_CAP.5.21C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation provides 
adequate justification that the acceptance procedures provide 
adequate and appropriate review for all changes made to 
configuration items. 
ALC_DVS Dependency 
• The evaluator shall confirm that CM-specific security measures from 
the TSF are implemented and documented as necessary in the CM 
documentation. 
F. EAL 7 GUIDELINES 
As noted in the Common Criteria, no additional CM requirements or changes are 
needed to perform an evaluation at EAL7.  While no mandated requirements exist, some 
additional effort should be considered. 
1. Increasing the Sample Size 
Sampling is [CEM99]: 
… a defined procedure of an evaluator whereby some subset of a required 
set of evaluation evidence is examined and assumed to be representative 
for the entire set. 
While sampling is allowed for some CEM work items through EAL4, the 
“blanket” recommendation for the recommended higher EALs has not been made.  
Although possibly obvious, it is appropriate for evaluators to determine the need for 
increased sample sizes in order to successfully perform evaluations at higher assurance 
levels.  In most instances, high assurance products should have larger sample sizes than 
the recommended minimum size of 20%.  Sampling sizes for high assurance products 
need not follow the [CEM99]: 
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…commensurate with cost effectiveness… 
guideline.  Evaluators should ensure the required level of effort is expended to 
ensure maximum scope, depth, and rigor are used when evaluating products at EAL7.  
Without firm sampling size requirements, evaluators must balance the competing needs 
of cost-effective evaluations and providing TOE consumers a level of confidence (from 
the act of performing a “high assurance” evaluation).  At the highest assurance level 
(EAL7), it is appropriate to recommend 100% sampling sizes where possible.  Simply 
put, smaller sample sizes mean more of the TOE has not been inspected.  Increasing the 
TOE sampling percentage provides greater assurance that accidental or intentional TOE 
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V. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT EVALUATION 
GUIDELINES (EAL4 THROUGH EAL7) 
Configuration Evaluation Methodology Guidelines provide a starting point for the 
evaluation process and where needed evaluators should seek further clarification within 
the CC and CEM as appropriate. 
A. CM GUIDELINES FOR EAL4 
It should be noted that the following guidelines were taken directly from the CEM 
[CEM99].  They are presented here in order to provide a starting point where the CEM 
leaves off. 
ACM_AUT.1.1C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the automated 
measures to control access to the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unauthorised modification 
of the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator reviews the configuration management 
documentation to identify those individuals or roles authorised to 
make changes to the TOE implementation representation. For 
example, once it is under configuration management, access to an 
element of the implementation representation may only be allowed 
for the individual who performs the software integration role. 
• The evaluator should exercise the automated access control 
measures to determine whether they can be bypassed by an 
unauthorised role or user. This determination need only comprise a 
few basic tests. 
ACM_AUT.1.2C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for automated means to 
support generation of the TOE from its implementation representation. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from its 
implementation to a state ready to be delivered to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator should verify the existence of automated generation 
support procedures within the CM documentation. 
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• The evaluator shall examine the automated generation procedures to 
determine that they can be used to support generation of the TOE. 
• The evaluator determines that by following the generation 
procedures a TOE would be generated that reflects its 
implementation representation. The customer can then be confident 
that the version of the TOE delivered for installation implements 
the TSP as described in the ST. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the automated generation 
procedures help to ensure that all source files and related libraries 
that are relied upon to enforce the TSP are included in the 
compiled object code. 
• It should be noted that this requirement is only to provide support. 
For example, an approach that placed Unix makefiles under 
configuration management should be sufficient to meet the aim, 
given that in such a case automation would have made a significant 
contribution to accurate generation of the TOE. Automated 
procedures can assist in identifying the correct configuration items 
to be used in generating the TOE. 
ACM_AUT.1.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM plan includes information on the 
automated tools used in the CM system. 
ACM_AUT.1.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the information relating to the automated 
tools provided in the CM plan to determine that it describes how they are 
used. 
• The information provided in the CM plan provides the necessary 
detail for a user of the CM system to be able to operate the 
automated tools correctly in order to maintain the integrity of the 
TOE. For example, the information provided may include a 
description of:   
• the functionality provided by the tools; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to control 
changes to the implementation representation; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to support 
generation of the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM system to determine that the 
automated tools and procedures described in the CM plan are used. 
• This work unit may be viewed as an additional activity to be 
carried out in parallel with the evaluator’s examination into the use 
of the CM system required by ACM_CAP. The evaluator looks for 
evidence that the tools and procedures are in use. This should 
include a visit to the development site to witness operation of the 
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tools and procedures, and an examination of evidence produced 
through their use. 
• For guidance on site visits see Annex B.5. 
ACM_CAP.4.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the version of the TOE provided for 
evaluation is uniquely referenced. 
• The evaluator should use the developer’s CM system to validate 
the uniqueness of the reference by checking the configuration list 
to ensure that the configuration items are uniquely identified. 
Evidence that the version provided for evaluation is uniquely 
referenced may be incomplete if only one version is examined 
during the evaluation, and the evaluator should look for a 
referencing system that is capable of supporting unique references 
(e.g. use of numbers, letters or dates). However, the absence of any 
reference will normally lead to a fail verdict against this 
requirement unless the evaluator is confident that the TOE can be 
uniquely identified. 
• The evaluator should seek to examine more than one version of the 
TOE (e.g. during rework following discovery of a vulnerability), to 
check that the two versions are referenced differently. 
ACM_CAP.4.2C 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE provided for evaluation is labelled 
with its reference. 
• The evaluator should ensure that the TOE contains a unique 
reference such that it is possible to distinguish different versions of 
the TOE. This could be achieved through labelled packaging or 
media, or by a label displayed by the operational TOE. This is to 
ensure that it would be possible for consumers to identify the TOE 
(e.g. at the point of purchase or use). 
• The TOE may provide a method by which it can be easily 
identified. For example, a software TOE may display its name and 
version number during the start up routine, or in response to a 
command line entry. A hardware or firmware TOE may be 
identified by a part number physically stamped on the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE references used are consistent. 
• If the TOE is labelled more than once then the labels have to be 
consistent. For example, it should be possible to relate any labelled 
guidance documentation supplied as part of the TOE to the 
evaluated operational TOE. This ensures that consumers can be 
confident that they have purchased the evaluated version of the 
TOE, that they have installed this version, and that they have the 
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correct version of the guidance to operate the TOE in accordance 
with its ST. The evaluator can use the configuration list that is part 
of the provided CM documentation to verify the consistent use of 
identifiers. 
• The evaluator also verifies that the TOE reference is consistent 
with the ST. 
• For guidance on consistency analysis see Annex B.3. 
ACM_CAP.4.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
configuration list. 
• A configuration list identifies the items being maintained under 
configuration control. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
CM plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes 
an acceptance plan. 
ACM_CAP.4.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the configuration list to determine that it 
identifies the configuration items that comprise the TOE. 
• The minimum scope of configuration items to be covered in the 
configuration list is given by ACM_SCP. 
ACM_CAP.4.5C 
• The evaluator shall examine the method of identifying configuration 
items to determine that it describes how configuration items are uniquely 
identified. 
ACM_CAP.4.6C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list uniquely identifies 
each configuration item. 
• The configuration list contains a list of the configuration items that 
comprise the TOE, together with sufficient information to uniquely 
identify which version of each item has been used (typically a 
version number). Use of this list will enable the evaluator to check 
that the correct configuration items, and the correct version of each 






• The evaluator shall examine the CM plan to determine that it describes 
how the CM system is used to maintain the integrity of the TOE 
configuration items. 
• The descriptions contained in a CM plan may include:   
• all activities performed in the TOE development 
environment that are subject to configuration management 
procedures (e.g. creation, modification or deletion of a 
configuration item); 
• the roles and responsibilities of individuals required to 
perform operations on individual configuration items 
(different roles may be identified for different types of 
configuration item (e.g. design documentation or source 
code)); 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that only authorised 
individuals can make changes to configuration items; 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that concurrency 
problems do not occur as a result of simultaneous changes 
to configuration items; 
• the evidence that is generated as a result of application of 
the procedures.  For example, for a change to a 
configuration item, the CM system might record a 
description of the change, accountability for the change, 
identification of all configuration items affected, status (e.g. 
pending or completed), and date and time of the change. 
This might be recorded in an audit trail of changes made or 
change control records; 
• the approach to version control and unique referencing of 
TOE versions (e.g. covering the release of patches in 
operating systems, and the subsequent detection of their 
application). 
ACM_CAP.4.8C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation to ascertain that it 
includes the CM system records identified by the CM plan. 
• The output produced by the CM system should provide the 
evidence that the evaluator needs to be confident that the CM plan 
is being applied, and also that all configuration items are being 
maintained by the CM system as required by ACM_CAP.4.9C. 
Example output could include change control forms, or 
configuration item access approval forms. 
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• The evaluator shall examine the evidence to determine that the CM 
system is being used as it is described in the CM plan. 
• The evaluator should select and examine a sample of evidence 
covering each type of CM-relevant operation that has been 
performed on a configuration item (e.g. creation, modification, 
deletion, reversion to an earlier version) to confirm that all 
operations of the CM system have been carried out in line with 
documented procedures. The evaluator confirms that the evidence 
includes all the information identified for that operation in the CM 
plan. Examination of the evidence may require access to a CM tool 
that is used. The evaluator may choose to sample the evidence. 
• For guidance on sampling see Annex B.2. 
• Further confidence in the correct operation of the CM system and 
the effective maintenance of configuration items may be 
established by means of interview with selected development staff. 
In conducting such interviews, the evaluator should aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of how the CM system is used in practice as 
well as to confirm that the CM procedures are being applied as 
described in the CM documentation. Note that such interviews 
should complement rather than replace the examination of 
documentary evidence, and may not be necessary if the 
documentary evidence alone satisfies the requirement. However, 
given the wide scope of the CM plan it is possible that some 
aspects (e.g. roles and responsibilities) may not be clear from the 
CM plan and records alone. This is one case where clarification 
may be necessary through interviews. 
• It is expected that the evaluator will visit the development site in 
support of this activity. 
• For guidance on site visits see Annex B.5. 
ACM_CAP.4.9C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration items identified in the 
configuration list are being maintained by the CM system. 
• The CM system employed by the developer should maintain the 
integrity of the TOE. The evaluator should check that for each type 
of configuration item (e.g. high-level design or source code 
modules) contained in the configuration list there are examples of 
the evidence generated by the procedures described in the CM 
plan. In this case, the approach to sampling will depend upon the 
level of granularity used in the CM system to control CM items. 
Where, for example, 10,000 source code modules are identified in 
the configuration list, a different sampling strategy should be 
applied compared to the case in which there are only 5, or even 1. 
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The emphasis of this activity should be on ensuring that the CM 
system is being operated correctly, rather than on the detection of 
any minor error. 
• For guidance on sampling see Annex B.2. 
ACM_CAP.4.10C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM access control measures described in 
the CM plan to determine that they are effective in preventing 
unauthorised access to the configuration items. 
• The evaluator may use a number of methods to determine that the 
CM access control measures are effective. For example, the 
evaluator may exercise the access control measures to ensure that 
the procedures could not be bypassed. The evaluator may use the 
outputs generated by the CM system procedures and already 
examined as part of the work unit 4:ACM_CAP.4-13. The 
evaluator may also witness a demonstration of the CM system to 
ensure that the access control measures employed are operating 
effectively. 
• The developer will have provided automated access control 
measures as part of the CM system and as such their suitability 
may be verified under the component ACM_AUT.1 
ACM_CAP.4.11C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for procedures for 
supporting the generation of the TOE. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from 
implementation to a state acceptable for delivery to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator verifies the existence of generation support 
procedures within the CM documentation. The generation support 
procedures provided by the developer may be automated, and as 
such their existence may be verified under the component 
ACM_AUT.1.2C. 
• The evaluator shall examine the TOE generation procedures to determine 
that they are effective in helping to ensure that the correct configuration 
items are used to generate the TOE. 
• The evaluator determines that by following the generation support 
procedures the version of the TOE expected by the customer (i.e. 
as described in the TOE ST and consisting of the correct 
configuration items) would be generated and delivered for 
installation at the customer site. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the procedures ensure that all 
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source files and related libraries are included in the compiled 
object code. 
• The evaluator should bear in mind that the CM system need not 
necessarily possess the capability to generate the TOE, but should 
provide support for the process that will help reduce the probability 
of human error. 
ACM_CAP.4.12C 
• The evaluator shall examine the acceptance procedures to determine that 
they describe the acceptance criteria to be applied to newly created or 
modified configuration items. 
• An acceptance plan describes the procedures that are to be used to 
ensure that the constituent parts of the TOE are of adequate quality 
prior to incorporation into the TOE. The acceptance plan should 
identify the acceptance procedures to be applied: 
• at each stage of the construction of the TOE (e.g. module, 
integration, system); 
• to the acceptance of software, firmware and hardware 
components; 
• to the acceptance of previously evaluated components. 
• The description of the acceptance criteria may include 
identification of: 
• such configuration items; 
• any acceptance criteria to be applied before the 
configuration items are accepted (e.g. successful document 
review, or successful testing in the case of software, 
firmware or hardware). 
ACM_SCP.2.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list includes the minimum 
set of items required by the CC to be tracked by the CM system. 
• The list should include the following as a minimum:   
• all documentation required to meet the target level of 
assurance; 
• test software (if applicable); 
• the TOE implementation representation (i.e. the 
components or subsystems that compose the TOE). For a 
software-only TOE, the implementation representation may 
consist solely of source code; for a TOE that includes a 
hardware platform, the implementation representation may 
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refer to a combination of software, firmware and a 
description of the hardware (or a reference platform). 
• the documentation used to record details of reported 
security flaws associated with the implementation (e.g. 
problem status reports derived from a developer’s problem 
reporting database). 
ACM_SCP.2.2C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM documentation to determine that the 
procedures describe how the status of each configuration item can be 
tracked throughout the lifecycle of the TOE. 
• The procedures may be detailed in the CM plan or throughout the 
CM documentation. The information included should describe: 
• how each configuration item is uniquely identified, such 
that it is possible to track versions of the same 
configuration item; 
• how configuration items are assigned unique identifiers and 
how they are entered into the CM system; 
• the method to be used to identify superseded versions of a 
configuration item; 
• the method to be used for identifying and tracking 
configuration items through each stage of the TOE 
development and maintenance lifecycle (i.e. requirements 
specification, design, source code development, through to 
object code generation and on to executable code, module 
testing, implementation and operation); 
• the method used for assigning the current status of the 
configuration item at a given point in time and for tracking 
each configuration item through the various levels of 
representation at the development phase (i.e. source code 
development, through to object code generation and on to 
executable code, module testing and documentation); 
• the method used for identifying and tracking flaws relative 
to configuration items throughout the development 
lifecycle; 
• the method used for identifying correspondence between 
configuration items such that if one configuration item is 
changed it can be determined which other configuration 
items will also need to be changed. 
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• The analysis of the CM documentation for some of this 
information may have been satisfied by work units detailed under 
ACM_CAP. 
B. CM GUIDELINES FOR EAL5 
The following guidelines incorporate the changes and additions required in order 
to perform an evaluation at EAL5.  Where appropriate, changes made to existing 
guidance from EAL4 [CEM99] are noted in bold face type. 
ACM_AUT.1.1C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the automated 
measures to control access to the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unathorised modification of 
the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator reviews the configuration management 
documentation to identify those individuals or roles authorized to 
make changes to the TOE implementation representation. For 
example, once it is under configuration management, access to an 
element of the implementation representation may only be allowed 
for the individual who performs the software integration role. 
• The evaluator should exercise the automated access control 
measures to determine whether they can be bypassed by an 
unathorised role or user. This determination need only comprise a 
few basic tests. 
ACM_AUT.1.2C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for automated means to 
support generation of the TOE from its implementation representation. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from its 
implementation to a state ready to be delivered to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator should verify the existence of automated generation 
support procedures within the CM documentation. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated generation procedures to 
determine that they can be used to support generation of the TOE. 
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• The evaluator determines that by following the generation 
procedures a TOE would be generated that reflects its 
implementation representation. The customer can then be confident 
that the version of the TOE delivered for installation implements 
the TSP as described in the ST. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the automated generation 
procedures help to ensure that all source files and related libraries 
that are relied upon to enforce the TSP are included in the 
compiled object code. 
• It should be noted that this requirement is only to provide support. 
For example, an approach that placed Unix makefiles under 
configuration management should be sufficient to meet the aim, 
given that in such a case automation would have made a significant 
contribution to accurate generation of the TOE. Automated 
procedures can assist in identifying the correct configuration items 
to be used in generating the TOE. 
ACM_AUT.1.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM plan includes information on the 
automated tools used in the CM system. 
ACM_AUT.1.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the information relating to the automated 
tools provided in the CM plan to determine that it describes how they are 
used. 
• The information provided in the CM plan provides the necessary 
detail for a user of the CM system to be able to operate the 
automated tools correctly in order to maintain the integrity of the 
TOE. For example, the information provided may include a 
description of:   
• the functionality provided by the tools; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to control 
changes to the implementation representation; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to support 
generation of the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM system to determine that the 
automated tools and procedures described in the CM plan are used. 
• This work unit may be viewed as an additional activity to be 
carried out in parallel with the evaluator’s examination into the use 
of the CM system required by ACM_CAP. The evaluator looks for 
evidence that the tools and procedures are in use. This should 
include a visit to the development site to witness operation of the 
tools and procedures, and an examination of evidence produced 
through their use. 




• The evaluator shall check that the version of the TOE provided for 
evaluation is uniquely referenced. 
• The evaluator should use the developer’s CM system to validate 
the uniqueness of the reference by checking the configuration list 
to ensure that the configuration items are uniquely identified. 
Evidence that the version provided for evaluation is uniquely 
referenced may be incomplete if only one version is examined 
during the evaluation, and the evaluator should look for a 
referencing system that is capable of supporting unique references 
(e.g. use of numbers, letters or dates). However, the absence of any 
reference will normally lead to a fail verdict against this 
requirement unless the evaluator is confident that the TOE can be 
uniquely identified. 
• The evaluator should seek to examine more than one version of the 
TOE (e.g. during rework following discovery of a vulnerability), to 
check that the two versions are referenced differently. 
ACM_CAP.4.2C 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE provided for evaluation is labelled 
with its reference. 
• The evaluator should ensure that the TOE contains a unique 
reference such that it is possible to distinguish different versions of 
the TOE. This could be achieved through labelled packaging or 
media, or by a label displayed by the operational TOE. This is to 
ensure that it would be possible for consumers to identify the TOE 
(e.g. at the point of purchase or use). 
• The TOE may provide a method by which it can be easily 
identified. For example, a software TOE may display its name and 
version number during the start up routine, or in response to a 
command line entry. A hardware or firmware TOE may be 
identified by a part number physically stamped on the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE references used are consistent. 
• If the TOE is labelled more than once then the labels have to be 
consistent. For example, it should be possible to relate any labelled 
guidance documentation supplied as part of the TOE to the 
evaluated operational TOE. This ensures that consumers can be 
confident that they have purchased the evaluated version of the 
TOE, that they have installed this version, and that they have the 
correct version of the guidance to operate the TOE in accordance 
with its ST. The evaluator can use the configuration list that is part 
of the provided CM documentation to verify the consistent use of 
identifiers. 
42 
• The evaluator also verifies that the TOE reference is consistent 
with the ST. 
• For guidance on consistency analysis see Annex B.3. 
ACM_CAP.4.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
configuration list. 
• A configuration list identifies the items being maintained under 
configuration control. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
CM plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes 
an acceptance plan. 
ACM_CAP.4.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the configuration list to determine that it 
identifies the configuration items that comprise the TOE. 
• The minimum scope of configuration items to be covered in the 
configuration list is given by ACM_SCP. 
ACM_CAP.4.5C 
• The evaluator shall examine the method of identifying configuration 
items to determine that it describes how configuration items are uniquely 
identified. 
ACM_CAP.4.6C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list uniquely identifies 
each configuration item. 
• The configuration list contains a list of the configuration items that 
comprise the TOE, together with sufficient information to uniquely 
identify which version of each item has been used (typically a 
version number). Use of this list will enable the evaluator to check 
that the correct configuration items, and the correct version of each 
item, have been used during the evaluation. 
ACM_CAP.4.7C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM plan to determine that it describes 
how the CM system is used to maintain the integrity of the TOE 
configuration items. 
• The descriptions contained in a CM plan may include:   
• all activities performed in the TOE development 
environment that are subject to configuration management 
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procedures (e.g. creation, modification or deletion of a 
configuration item); 
• the roles and responsibilities of individuals required to 
perform operations on individual configuration items 
(different roles may be identified for different types of 
configuration item (e.g. design documentation or source 
code)); 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that only authorized 
individuals can make changes to configuration items; 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that concurrency 
problems do not occur as a result of simultaneous changes 
to configuration items; 
• the evidence that is generated as a result of application of 
the procedures.  For example, for a change to a 
configuration item, the CM system might record a 
description of the change, accountability for the change, 
identification of all configuration items affected, status (e.g. 
pending or completed), and date and time of the change. 
This might be recorded in an audit trail of changes made or 
change control records; 
• the approach to version control and unique referencing of 
TOE versions (e.g. covering the release of patches in 
operating systems, and the subsequent detection of their 
application). 
ACM_CAP.4.8C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation to ascertain that it 
includes the CM system records identified by the CM plan. 
• The output produced by the CM system should provide the 
evidence that the evaluator needs to be confident that the CM plan 
is being applied, and also that all configuration items are being 
maintained by the CM system as required by ACM_CAP.4.9C. 
Example output could include change control forms, or 
configuration item access approval forms. 
• The evaluator shall examine the evidence to determine that the CM 
system is being used as it is described in the CM plan. 
• The evaluator should select and examine a sample of evidence 
covering each type of CM-relevant operation that has been 
performed on a configuration item (e.g. creation, modification, 
deletion, reversion to an earlier version) to confirm that all 
operations of the CM system have been carried out in line with 
documented procedures. The evaluator confirms that the evidence 
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includes all the information identified for that operation in the CM 
plan. Examination of the evidence may require access to a CM tool 
that is used. The evaluator may choose to sample the evidence. 
• For guidance on sampling see Annex B.2. 
• Further confidence in the correct operation of the CM system and 
the effective maintenance of configuration items may be 
established by means of interview with selected development staff. 
In conducting such interviews, the evaluator should aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of how the CM system is used in practice as 
well as to confirm that the CM procedures are being applied as 
described in the CM documentation. Note that such interviews 
should complement rather than replace the examination of 
documentary evidence, and may not be necessary if the 
documentary evidence alone satisfies the requirement. However, 
given the wide scope of the CM plan it is possible that some 
aspects (e.g. roles and responsibilities) may not be clear from the 
CM plan and records alone. This is one case where clarification 
may be necessary through interviews. 
• It is expected that the evaluator will visit the development site in 
support of this activity. 
• For guidance on site visits see Annex B.5. 
ACM_CAP.4.9C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration items identified in the 
configuration list are being maintained by the CM system. 
• The CM system employed by the developer should maintain the 
integrity of the TOE. The evaluator should check that for each type 
of configuration item (e.g. high-level design or source code 
modules) contained in the configuration list there are examples of 
the evidence generated by the procedures described in the CM 
plan. In this case, the approach to sampling will depend upon the 
level of granularity used in the CM system to control CM items. 
Where, for example, 10,000 source code modules are identified in 
the configuration list, a different sampling strategy should be 
applied compared to the case in which there are only 5, or even 1. 
The emphasis of this activity should be on ensuring that the CM 
system is being operated correctly, rather than on the detection of 
any minor error. 





• The evaluator shall examine the CM access control measures described in 
the CM plan to determine that they are effective in preventing 
unauthorised access to the configuration items. 
• The evaluator may use a number of methods to determine that the 
CM access control measures are effective. For example, the 
evaluator may exercise the access control measures to ensure that 
the procedures could not be bypassed. The evaluator may use the 
outputs generated by the CM system procedures and already 
examined as part of the work unit 4:ACM_CAP.4-13. The 
evaluator may also witness a demonstration of the CM system to 
ensure that the access control measures employed are operating 
effectively. 
• The developer will have provided automated access control 
measures as part of the CM system and as such their suitability 
may be verified under the component ACM_AUT.1 
ACM_CAP.4.11C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for procedures for 
supporting the generation of the TOE. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from 
implementation to a state acceptable for delivery to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator verifies the existence of generation support 
procedures within the CM documentation. The generation support 
procedures provided by the developer may be automated, and as 
such their existence may be verified under the component 
ACM_AUT.1.2C. 
• The evaluator shall examine the TOE generation procedures to determine 
that they are effective in helping to ensure that the correct configuration 
items are used to generate the TOE. 
• The evaluator determines that by following the generation support 
procedures the version of the TOE expected by the customer (i.e. 
as described in the TOE ST and consisting of the correct 
configuration items) would be generated and delivered for 
installation at the customer site. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the procedures ensure that all 





• The evaluator should bear in mind that the CM system need not 
necessarily possess the capability to generate the TOE, but should 
provide support for the process that will help reduce the probability 
of human error. 
ACM_CAP.4.12C 
• The evaluator shall examine the acceptance procedures to determine that 
they describe the acceptance criteria to be applied to newly created or 
modified configuration items. 
• An acceptance plan describes the procedures that are to be used to 
ensure that the constituent parts of the TOE are of adequate quality 
prior to incorporation into the TOE. The acceptance plan should 
identify the acceptance procedures to be applied: 
• at each stage of the construction of the TOE (e.g. module, 
integration, system); 
• to the acceptance of software, firmware and hardware 
components; 
• to the acceptance of previously evaluated components. 
• The description of the acceptance criteria may include 
identification of: 
• developer roles or individuals responsible for accepting 
such  
configuration items; 
• any acceptance criteria to be applied before the 
configuration items are accepted (e.g. successful document 
review, or successful testing in the case of software, 
firmware or hardware). 
ACM_SCP.3.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list includes the minimum 
set of items required by the CC to be tracked by the CM system. 
• The list should include the following as a minimum:   
• all documentation required to meet the target level of 
assurance; 
• test software (if applicable); 
• the TOE implementation representation (i.e. the 
components or subsystems that compose the TOE). For a 
software-only TOE, the implementation representation may 
consist solely of source code; for a TOE that includes a 
hardware platform, the implementation representation may 
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refer to a combination of software, firmware and a 
description of the hardware (or a reference platform). 
• the documentation used to record details of reported 
security flaws associated with the implementation (e.g. 
problem status reports derived from a developer’s problem 
reporting database). 
• development tools (e.g. programming languages and 
compilers) and related documentation (e.g. Information 
pertaining to TOE generation items (such as compiler 
options, installation/generation options, and build 
options). 
• The evaluator shall confirm the level of documentation necessary for 
ensuring proper visibility of the development tools and related 
documentation throughout the entire CM documentation. 
• The evaluator shall confirm the development tools and related 
documentation listed in the CM documentation is resident in the CM 
system.  In performance of this action item, the evaluator does not 
need independent access to determine the sufficiency of 
correspondence between the system configuration list and 
documentation.  
ACM_SCP.3.2C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM documentation to determine that the 
procedures describe how the status of each configuration item can be 
tracked throughout the lifecycle of the TOE. 
• The procedures may be detailed in the CM plan or throughout the 
CM documentation. The information included should describe: 
• how each configuration item is uniquely identified, such 
that it is possible to track versions of the same 
configuration item; 
• how configuration items are assigned unique identifiers and 
how they are entered into the CM system; 
• the method to be used to identify superseded versions of a 
configuration item; 
• the method to be used for identifying and tracking 
configuration items through each stage of the TOE 
development and maintenance lifecycle (i.e. requirements 
specification, design, source code development, through to 
object code generation and on to executable code, module 
testing, implementation and operation); 
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• the method used for assigning the current status of the 
configuration item at a given point in time and for tracking 
each configuration item through the various levels of 
representation at the development phase (i.e. source code 
development, through to object code generation and on to 
executable code, module testing and documentation); 
• the method used for identifying and tracking flaws relative 
to configuration items throughout the development 
lifecycle; 
• the method used for identifying correspondence between 
configuration items such that if one configuration item is 
changed it can be determined which other configuration 
items will also need to be changed. 
• The analysis of the CM documentation for some of this 
information may have been satisfied by work units detailed under 
ACM_CAP. 
C. CM GUIDELINES FOR EAL6 
The following guidelines incorporate the changes and additions required in order 
to perform an evaluation at EAL5.  Where appropriate, changes made to existing 
guidance inherited from EAL5 are noted in bold face type. 
ACM_AUT.2.1C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the automated 
measures to control access to the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unathorised modification of 
the TOE implementation representation. 
• The evaluator shall check the CM plan for a description of the 
automated measures to control access to the configuration items. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated access control measures to 
determine that they are effective in preventing unauthorized 
modification of configuration items. 
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• The evaluator reviews the configuration management 
documentation to identify those individuals or roles authorized to 
make changes to the TOE implementation representation. For 
example, once it is under configuration management, access to an 
element of the implementation representation may only be allowed 
for the individual who performs the software integration role.  
Similarly, the evaluator reviews the CM documentation to 
identify those individuals or roles authorized to access a 
configuration item. 
• The evaluator should exercise the automated access control 
measures to determine whether they can be bypassed by an 
unathorised role or user. This determination need only comprise a 
few basic tests.  Tests should cover the TOE implementation 
representation and configuration items. 
ACM_AUT.2.2C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for automated means to 
support generation of the TOE from its implementation representation. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from its 
implementation to a state ready to be delivered to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator should verify the existence of automated generation 
support procedures within the CM documentation. 
• The evaluator shall examine the automated generation procedures to 
determine that they can be used to support generation of the TOE. 
• The evaluator determines that by following the generation 
procedures a TOE would be generated that reflects its 
implementation representation. The customer can then be confident 
that the version of the TOE delivered for installation implements 
the TSP as described in the ST. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the automated generation 
procedures help to ensure that all source files and related libraries 
that are relied upon to enforce the TSP are included in the 
compiled object code. 
• It should be noted that this requirement is only to provide support. 
For example, an approach that placed Unix makefiles under 
configuration management should be sufficient to meet the aim, 
given that in such a case automation would have made a significant 
contribution to accurate generation of the TOE. Automated 
procedures can assist in identifying the correct configuration items 
to be used in generating the TOE. 
ACM_AUT.2.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM plan includes information on the 
automated tools used in the CM system. 
ACM_AUT.2.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the information relating to the automated 
tools provided in the CM plan to determine that it describes how they are 
used. 
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• The information provided in the CM plan provides the necessary 
detail for a user of the CM system to be able to operate the 
automated tools correctly in order to maintain the integrity of the 
TOE. For example, the information provided may include a 
description of:   
• the functionality provided by the tools; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to control 
changes to the implementation representation; 
• how this functionality is used by the developer to support 
generation of the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM system to determine that the 
automated tools and procedures described in the CM plan are used. 
• This work unit may be viewed as an additional activity to be 
carried out in parallel with the evaluator’s examination into the use 
of the CM system required by ACM_CAP. The evaluator looks for 
evidence that the tools and procedures are in use. This should 
include a visit to the development site to witness operation of the 
tools and procedures, and an examination of evidence produced 
through their use. 
• For guidance on site visits see Annex B.5. 
ACM_AUT.2.5C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for a description of 
the automated means by which changes can be ascertained between 
the TOE and its preceding version. 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM system to ensure it has the 
capability to provide an automated means to ascertain the changes 
between the TOE and its preceding version. 
• The evaluator should verify the existence of the automated 
means to ascertain changes procedures within the CM 
documentation. 
• Previous TOE versions may or may not exist.  Regardless, 
evaluators should exercise the automated mechanisms within 
the CM system or verify the capability exists. 
ACM_AUT.2.6C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation includes 
information on the automated means to identify all other 
configuration items that are affected by the modification of a given 
configuration item. 
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• The evaluator shall examine the automated mechanisms used by the 
CM system to identify all other configuration items that are affected 
by the modification of a given configuration item. 
• The CM documentation should state how the automated means 
will identify the changes to configuration items that are 
affected by the modification of a given configuration item.  CM 
systems may differ on how this information is presented. 
ACM_CAP.5.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the version of the TOE provided for 
evaluation is uniquely referenced. 
• The evaluator should use the developer’s CM system to validate 
the uniqueness of the reference by checking the configuration list 
to ensure that the configuration items are uniquely identified. 
Evidence that the version provided for evaluation is uniquely 
referenced may be incomplete if only one version is examined 
during the evaluation, and the evaluator should look for a 
referencing system that is capable of supporting unique references 
(e.g. use of numbers, letters or dates). However, the absence of any 
reference will normally lead to a fail verdict against this 
requirement unless the evaluator is confident that the TOE can be 
uniquely identified. 
• The evaluator should seek to examine more than one version of the 
TOE (e.g. during rework following discovery of a vulnerability), to 
check that the two versions are referenced differently. 
ACM_CAP.5.2C 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE provided for evaluation is labelled 
with its reference. 
• The evaluator should ensure that the TOE contains a unique 
reference such that it is possible to distinguish different versions of 
the TOE. This could be achieved through labelled packaging or 
media, or by a label displayed by the operational TOE. This is to 
ensure that it would be possible for consumers to identify the TOE  
(e.g. at the point of purchase or use). 
• The TOE may provide a method by which it can be easily 
identified. For example, a software TOE may display its name and 
version number during the start up routine, or in response to a 
command line entry. A hardware or firmware TOE may be 
identified by a part number physically stamped on the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall check that the TOE references used are consistent. 
• If the TOE is labelled more than once then the labels have to be 
consistent. For example, it should be possible to relate any labelled 
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guidance documentation supplied as part of the TOE to the 
evaluated operational TOE. This ensures that consumers can be 
confident that they have purchased the evaluated version of the 
TOE, that they have installed this version, and that they have the 
correct version of the guidance to operate the TOE in accordance 
with its ST. The evaluator can use the configuration list that is part 
of the provided CM documentation to verify the consistent use of 
identifiers. 
• The evaluator also verifies that the TOE reference is consistent 
with the ST. 
• For guidance on consistency analysis see Annex B.3. 
ACM_CAP.5.3C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
configuration list. 
• A configuration list identifies the items being maintained under 
configuration control. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes a 
CM plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided includes 
an acceptance plan. 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation provided 
includes integration procedures. 
ACM_CAP.5.4C 
• The evaluator shall examine the configuration list to determine that it 
identifies the configuration items that comprise the TOE. 
• The minimum scope of configuration items to be covered in the 
configuration list is given by ACM_SCP. 
ACM_CAP.5.5C 
• The evaluator shall examine the method of identifying configuration 
items to determine that it describes how configuration items are uniquely 
identified. 
ACM_CAP.5.6C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list uniquely identifies 
each configuration item. 
• The configuration list contains a list of the configuration items that 
comprise the TOE, together with sufficient information to uniquely 
identify which version of each item has been used (typically a 
version number). Use of this list will enable the evaluator to check 
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that the correct configuration items, and the correct version of each 
item, have been used during the evaluation. 
ACM_CAP.5.7C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM plan to determine that it describes 
how the CM system is used to maintain the integrity of the TOE 
configuration items. 
• The descriptions contained in a CM plan may include:   
• all activities performed in the TOE development 
environment that are subject to configuration management 
procedures (e.g. creation, modification or deletion of a 
configuration item); 
• the roles and responsibilities of individuals required to 
perform operations on individual configuration items 
(different roles may be identified for different types of 
configuration item (e.g. design documentation or source 
code)); 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that only authorized 
individuals can make changes to configuration items; 
• the procedures that are used to ensure that concurrency 
problems do not occur as a result of simultaneous changes 
to configuration items; 
• the evidence that is generated as a result of application of 
the procedures.  For example, for a change to a 
configuration item, the CM system might record a 
description of the change, accountability for the change, 
identification of all configuration items affected, status (e.g. 
pending or completed), and date and time of the change. 
This might be recorded in an audit trail of changes made or 
change control records; 
• the approach to version control and unique referencing of 
TOE versions (e.g. covering the release of patches in 
operating systems, and the subsequent detection of their 
application). 
ACM_CAP.5.8C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation to ascertain that it 
includes the CM system records identified by the CM plan. 
• The output produced by the CM system should provide the 
evidence that the evaluator needs to be confident that the CM plan 
is being applied, and also that all configuration items are being 
maintained by the CM system as required by ACM_CAP.4.9C. 
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Example output could include change control forms, or 
configuration item access approval forms. 
• The evaluator shall examine the evidence to determine that the CM 
system is being used as it is described in the CM plan. 
• The evaluator should select and examine a sample of evidence 
covering each type of CM-relevant operation that has been 
performed on a configuration item (e.g. creation, modification, 
deletion, reversion to an earlier version) to confirm that all 
operations of the CM system have been carried out in line with 
documented procedures. The evaluator confirms that the evidence 
includes all the information identified for that operation in the CM 
plan. Examination of the evidence may require access to a CM tool 
that is used. The evaluator may choose to sample the evidence. 
• For guidance on sampling see Annex B.2. 
• Further confidence in the correct operation of the CM system and 
the effective maintenance of configuration items may be 
established by means of interview with selected development staff. 
In conducting such interviews, the evaluator should aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of how the CM system is used in practice as 
well as to confirm that the CM procedures are being applied as 
described in the CM documentation. Note that such interviews 
should complement rather than replace the examination of 
documentary evidence, and may not be necessary if the 
documentary evidence alone satisfies the requirement. However, 
given the wide scope of the CM plan it is possible that some 
aspects (e.g. roles and responsibilities) may not be clear from the 
CM plan and records alone. This is one case where clarification 
may be necessary through interviews. 
• It is expected that the evaluator will visit the development site in 
support of this activity. 
• For guidance on site visits see Annex B.5. 
ACM_CAP.5.9C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration items identified in the 
configuration list are being maintained by the CM system. 
• The CM system employed by the developer should maintain the 
integrity of the TOE. The evaluator should check that for each type 
of configuration item (e.g. high-level design or source code 
modules) contained in the configuration list there are examples of 
the evidence generated by the procedures described in the CM 
plan. In this case, the approach to sampling will depend upon the 
level of granularity used in the CM system to control CM items. 
Where, for example, 10,000 source code modules are identified in 
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the configuration list, a different sampling strategy should be 
applied compared to the case in which there are only 5, or even 1. 
The emphasis of this activity should be on ensuring that the CM 
system is being operated correctly, rather than on the detection of 
any minor error. 
• For guidance on sampling see Annex B.2. 
ACM_CAP.5.10C 
• The evaluator shall examine the CM access control measures described in 
the CM plan to determine that they are effective in preventing unathorised 
access to the configuration items. 
• The evaluator may use a number of methods to determine that the 
CM access control measures are effective. For example, the 
evaluator may exercise the access control measures to ensure that 
the procedures could not be bypassed. The evaluator may use the 
outputs generated by the CM system procedures and already 
examined as part of the work unit 4:ACM_CAP.4-13. The 
evaluator may also witness a demonstration of the CM system to 
ensure that the access control measures employed are operating 
effectively. 
• The developer will have provided automated access control 
measures as part of the CM system and as such their suitability 
may be verified under the component ACM_AUT.1 
ACM_CAP.5.11C 
• The evaluator shall check the CM documentation for procedures for 
supporting the generation of the TOE. 
• In this work unit the term generation applies to those processes 
adopted by the developer to progress the TOE from 
implementation to a state acceptable for delivery to the end 
customer. 
• The evaluator verifies the existence of generation support 
procedures within the CM documentation. The generation support 
procedures provided by the developer may be automated, and as 
such their existence may be verified under the component 
ACM_AUT.1.2C. 
• The evaluator shall examine the TOE generation procedures to determine 
that they are effective in helping to ensure that the correct configuration 
items are used to generate the TOE. 
• The evaluator determines that by following the generation support 
procedures the version of the TOE expected by the customer (i.e. 
as described in the TOE ST and consisting of the correct 
configuration items) would be generated and delivered for 
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installation at the customer site. For example, in a software TOE 
this may include checking that the procedures ensure that all 
source files and related libraries are included in the compiled 
object code. 
• The evaluator should bear in mind that the CM system need not 
necessarily possess the capability to generate the TOE, but should 
provide support for the process that will help reduce the probability 
of human error. 
ACM_CAP.5.12C 
• The evaluator shall examine the acceptance procedures to determine that 
they describe the acceptance criteria to be applied to newly created or 
modified configuration items. 
• An acceptance plan describes the procedures that are to be used to 
ensure that the constituent parts of the TOE are of adequate quality 
prior to incorporation into the TOE. The acceptance plan should 
identify the acceptance procedures to be applied: 
• at each stage of the construction of the TOE (e.g. module, 
integration, system); 
• to the acceptance of software, firmware and hardware 
components; 
• to the acceptance of previously evaluated components. 
• The description of the acceptance criteria may include 
identification of: 
• developer roles or individuals responsible for accepting 
such configuration items; 
• any acceptance criteria to be applied before the 
configuration items are accepted (e.g. successful document 
review, or successful testing in the case of software, 
firmware or hardware). 
ACM_CAP.5.13C 
• The evaluator shall check that the integration procedures describe 
how the CM system is applied in the TOE manufacturing process. 
ACM_CAP.5.14C 
• The evaluator shall check that the CM documentation describes 
configuration item acceptance procedures. 
• The evaluator shall verify configuration item acceptance procedures 
in the CM system perform as described by the CM documentation. 
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• The CM system should prevent the person who developed the 
configuration item from being able to accept it.  
ACM_CAP.5.15C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation clearly 
identifies all configuration items that comprise the TSF. 
• The evaluator shall verify that the configuration items that comprise 
the TSF are clearly identified in the CM system.  
ACM_CAP.5.16C 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation describes the CM 
systems audit capabilities.   
• The CM system at a minimum will track all TOE modifications 
to include:  the originator, date, and time in the audit trail. 
• The evaluator shall verify the CM system’s TOE audit capabilities. 
• The audit portion of the CM system shall provide at a 
minimum the originator, date and time in the audit trail. 
ACM_CAP.5.17C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation describes how 
the CM system will identify the master copy of all material used to 
generate the TOE. 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM system identifies the master 
copy of all material used to generate the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.18C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation describes how 
the use of the CM system and development security measures will 
only allow authorized changes to be made to the TOE. 
ACM_CAP.5.19C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation describes how 
the use of the integration procedures will ensure that the generation of 
the TOE is performed correctly in the authorized manner.  
ACM_CAP.5.20C 
• The evaluator shall verify that the CM documentation sufficiently 
describes how the CM system will ensure that the person responsible 
for accepting a configuration item into the CM system is not the 





• The evaluator shall verify the CM documentation provides adequate 
justification that the acceptance procedures provide adequate and 
appropriate review for all changes made to configuration items. 
ALC_DVS Dependency 
• The evaluator shall confirm that CM-specific security measures from 
the TSF are implemented and documented as necessary in the CM 
documentation. 
ACM_SCP.3.1C 
• The evaluator shall check that the configuration list includes the minimum 
set of items required by the CC to be tracked by the CM system. 
• The list should include the following as a minimum:   
• all documentation required to meet the target level of 
assurance; 
• test software (if applicable); 
• the TOE implementation representation (i.e. the 
components or subsystems that compose the TOE). For a 
software-only TOE, the implementation representation may 
consist solely of source code; for a TOE that includes a 
hardware platform, the implementation representation may 
refer to a combination of software, firmware and a 
description of the hardware (or a reference platform). 
• the documentation used to record details of reported 
security flaws associated with the implementation (e.g. 
problem status reports derived from a developer’s problem 
reporting database). 
• development tools (e.g. programming languages and 
compilers) and related documentation (e.g. Information 
pertaining to TOE generation items (such as compiler 
options, installation/generation options, and build options). 
• The evaluator shall confirm the level of documentation necessary for 
ensuring proper visibility of the development tools and related 
documentation throughout the entire CM documentation. 
• The evaluator shall confirm the development tools and related 
documentation listed in the CM documentation is resident in the CM 
system.  In performance of this action item, the evaluator does not need 
independent access to determine the sufficiency of correspondence 




• The evaluator shall examine the CM documentation to determine that the 
procedures describe how the status of each configuration item can be 
tracked throughout the lifecycle of the TOE. 
• The procedures may be detailed in the CM plan or throughout the 
CM documentation. The information included should describe: 
• how each configuration item is uniquely identified, such 
that it is possible to track versions of the same 
configuration item; 
• how configuration items are assigned unique identifiers and 
how they are entered into the CM system; 
• the method to be used to identify superseded versions of a 
configuration item; 
• the method to be used for identifying and tracking 
configuration items through each stage of the TOE 
development and maintenance lifecycle (i.e. requirements 
specification, design, source code development, through to 
object code generation and on to executable code, module 
testing, implementation and operation); 
• the method used for assigning the current status of the 
configuration item at a given point in time and for tracking 
each configuration item through the various levels of 
representation at the development phase (i.e. source code 
development, through to object code generation and on to 
executable code, module testing and documentation); 
• the method used for identifying and tracking flaws relative 
to configuration items throughout the development 
lifecycle; 
• the method used for identifying correspondence between 
configuration items such that if one configuration item is 
changed it can be determined which other configuration 
items will also need to be changed. 
• The analysis of the CM documentation for some of this 
information may have been satisfied by work units detailed under 
ACM_CAP. 
D. CM GUIDELINES FOR EAL7 
There are no mandated changes for CM requirements at EAL7.  Guidelines for 
EAL6 are used when performing an evaluation.  As mentioned previously, special 
consideration is needed when determining the sample size.   
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a starting point, CEM guidelines for evaluators only suggest minimum 
activities that should be performed in order to conduct evaluations.  As we have seen, 
higher assurance levels require more evaluator actions in order to achieve the desired 
confidence that the TOE will perform as intended. 
A. CONCLUSION 
Webster’s Dictionary defines research as [WEB86]: 
Studious inquiry or examination aimed at the discovery and interpretation 
of facts, revision of accepted theories or laws in the light of new facts, or 
practical application of such new or revised theories or laws. 
As a research document, this work invokes aspects of the above definition when 
answering the question, “Are Configuration Management (CM) guidelines useful in the 
evaluation of trusted systems”.  Studious inquiry of the Common Criteria yielded crucial 
facts throughout the research process.  Part 3 of the Common Criteria [CCP399] provides 
the complete set of CM (developer and evaluator) requirements for all assurance levels.  
While a complete set of requirements is available, guidelines for evaluating the 
accomplishment of the requirements are incomplete.   
By stopping at EAL4, the CEM [CEM99] fails to provide CM guidelines needed 
to ensure a successful product evaluation at high assurance levels (EAL5-7).  Lack of 
guidance leaves requirement interpretation open to individual evaluators.  The 
recommended CM guidelines developed here provide a starting point for the evaluation 
process and enable uniform application of CM requirements at high assurance levels.   
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CM guideline recommendations have been made by utilizing the idea of 
“inheritance and change” provided by the graded assurance scale within the CC.  Higher 
assurance levels build on existing requirements, make changes where needed and add 
requirements in order to provide increased assurance at the next higher level.  EAL4 
guidance from the CEM combined with the requirements from the CC provided a key 
stepping stone for guideline generation.  Guidance extension of the CEM for high 
assurance CM leads to the hypothesis:  Configuration Management guidelines for trusted 
computing systems are useful. 
The guidelines recommended in this work pick up at EAL5 where the current 
CEM provides no guidance.  The result is a complete set of guidelines from which 
several benefits accrue.  A complete set of guidelines will be useful in helping developers 
generate the required content and presentation evidence needed for developing products 
at any evaluated assurance level.  Recommended guidelines will also provide a useful 
starting point for professional evaluators when performing a CM evaluation at the higher 
assurance levels. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Successful guideline generation does not mean this work is a success.  More 
feedback is needed to verify that the author’s interpretation of the Common Criteria 
[CCP399] is relevant and useful.  While it is recognized feedback can come in several 
forms, appropriate feedback would include comments from professional evaluators.  
Other feedback could result from using the recommended guidelines to perform an 
evaluation at EAL5, 6, or 7. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research which incorporates feedback will enhance the benefits provided 
from the creation of initial CM evaluation methodology guidelines.  Other areas of 
research which focus on proposed changes to the Common Criteria may also be needed. 
1. Change within the Common Criteria 
The countries which recognize the Common Criteria met in January this year.  
The representatives from Germany have proposed a change to the Common Criteria 
[ONC03].  If approved this change will combine three of the assurance classes that make 
up the Common Criteria:  Configuration Management, Life Cycle Support, and Delivery 
and Operation.  Future study may be needed to ensure that the proposed extension of 
CEM guidelines for high assurance CM in this work remain relevant regarding future 
changes within the Common Criteria. 
2. Other Regulatory Guidance 
Other guidance places information security and assurance requirements on 
products and systems used and purchased by the Department of Defense.  The National 
Information Assurance Certification and Accreditization Process (NIACAP) [NST00] 
and the Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
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Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) [DCP00] are two examples of other regulatory 
guidance.  DITSCAP and NIACAP contain CM requirements similar to the Common 
Criteria.  Investigation of other regulatory guidance produced after the Common Criteria 
that provides CM guidance should be conducted to determine where overlap or 
conflicting requirements may exist.  Common CM evaluation guidance derived from the 
overlap between the Common Criteria, DITSCAP, NIACAP, and other regulatory 
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